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Introduction
Like in many places, by-elections are used to fi ll causal vacancies1 
in Hong Kong’s Legislative Council (LegCo).2 In June 2011, the 
Hong Kong government proposed, without any formal public consultation 
in advance, to abolish such by-elections and to adopt an automatic rule 
that would fi ll the vacancy with the candidate who lost in the original 
election but was next in line to obtain a seat under the proportional 
representation system (the Original Proposal). After a fair amount of 
public criticism of the Original Proposal and the lack of consultation, 
reminiscent of the 2003 controversy with the failed national security 
bill,3 the government retreated and decided to conduct a proper public 
consultation with options (the option favoured by the government in 
the consultation paper was different from the Original Proposal). The 
government issued a consultation paper, entitled “Consultation Paper 
on Arrangements for Filling Vacancies in the Legislative Council”, on 
22 July 2011.4 The consultation period ended on 24 September 2011. 
After a cabinet reshuffl ing due to Henry Tang’s resignation as Chief 
Secretary on 28 September 2011 to consider running for the Chief 
Executive, a new Secretary for Constitutional and Mainland Affairs, 
Raymond Tam, was given responsibility to oversee the by-election reform 
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1 Vacancies that do not arise from expiry of the term, such as due to illness, death or other reasons.
2 Legislative Council Ordinance (Cap 542), s 36. 
3 See Fu Hualing, Carole Petersen & Simon Young (eds), National Security and Fundamental 
 Freedoms: Hong Kong’s Article 23 Under Scrutiny (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 
2005) ch 1.
4 The Constitutional and Mainland Affairs Bureau, “Consultation Paper on Arrangements 
for Filling Vacancies in the Legislative Council”, (2011). (Hereinafter referred to as 
the  “Consultation Paper”.) The government’s proposal applies not only to the existing 
Geographical Constituencies but also to the future District Councils Functional Constituency. 
Abolishing By-elections to Fill Vacancies in the 
Legislative Council
?
COMMENT
01-HKLJ-Young.indd   601 12/9/2011   5:33:51 PM
602 Peter Chau and Simon N.M. Young (2011) HKLJ
issue which under the previous Secretary, Stephen Lam, was intended to 
be completed in the 2011–2012 legislative year.5
This article will, fi rst, provide some background on the government’s 
proposal; second, offer some critical comments on the Consultation 
Paper; and third, offer some concluding thoughts. 
Background on the Consultation Paper
By-elections have always been used to fi ll causal vacancies in constituencies 
elected by proportional representation in LegCo. Two such by-elections 
were held in 2000 and 2007 respectively and the government did not see 
a need for change in those years.6 So why did the government suddenly 
propose a change in 2011?
This had to do with the so-called “referendum” in 2010, a scheme 
devised by pan-democratic parties to demonstrate that the Hong Kong 
public is in favour of specifi c democratic reforms. Five legislators from 
the Civic Party and the League of Social Democrats, one in each of 
the LegCo geographical constituencies, resigned on 21 January 2010 to 
trigger fi ve by-elections concurrently held on 16 May 2010. As was their 
plan, the fi ve resigned legislators stood for election in the by-elections. 
If they were all re-elected, then it would demonstrate the Hong Kong 
public was in favour of the reforms for which the resigned legislators 
were advocating.7
The Hong Kong government reacted strongly to that scheme, claiming 
that intentional triggering of by-elections amounted to an abuse of 
process. In fact, in an unprecedented manner, the politically appointed 
offi cials of the HKSAR publicly announced that they would not vote in 
the by-elections. The Chinese government was also unhappy with the 
so-called referendum. The Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Offi ce of the 
Chinese government made a statement on 15 January 2010 claiming 
that such referendum was “inconsistent with the legal position of the 
HKSAR”.8 As was expected, the fi ve pan-democratic legislators were all 
elected back into offi ce on 16 May 2010.
5 Consultation Paper, para 5.05.
6 The two by-elections were held to fi ll the seats originally held by Gary Cheng and Lik Ma 
respectively.
7 Albert Chen, “An Unexpected Breakthrough in Hong Kong’s Constitutional Reform”, (2010) 
40 HKLJ 259.
8 The full text of the statement is available at http://www.hmo.gov.cn/Contents/Channel_ 
115/2010/0115/13133/content_13133.htm (visited 5 Nov 2011; in Chinese).
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The Hong Kong government obviously did not want similar events to 
happen again. With perceived public support on its side, the government 
introduced a bill into LegCo on 3 June 2011, without any formal public 
consultation in advance.9 We now know that the government misread the 
public’s likely response to the specifi c proposal, even though there may 
have been signifi cant public support for measures to prevent a repeat of 
the de facto referendum and its attendant costs. The Original Proposal as 
set out in the Legislative Council (Amendment) Bill 2011 was to replace 
the use of by-elections with a rule that a vacancy would be fi lled by the 
person who ranks highest on the precedence list of that constituency 
in the original election. The candidates on the precedence list are the 
candidates who are (a) unelected; and (b) highest in their respective 
candidate lists. Their ranking on the precedence list is determined by 
the remaining amount of votes in their lists in the original election. The 
remaining amount of votes a list had in the original election refers to the 
number of votes the list had in the original election minus the number of 
votes the list spent in returning Legco members. 
This may sound quite complicated to those unfamiliar with the 
proportional representation system, but a simple example will illustrate 
the idea.10 Suppose that 100 votes were cast in the original election 
for a constituency with fi ve seats, and two parties competed for those 
seats. Party A received 59 votes and party B received 41 votes. Given 
that 100 votes were cast for fi ve seats, the initial quota for returning a 
LegCo member is 20 votes (1/5 of 100). That is to say, any list can spend 
20 votes to obtain a seat. The result of this initial exercise is that 
two members on list A and two members on list B were elected. The 
remaining seat is fi lled as follows. After fi lling in the fi rst four seats, list A had 
19 votes remaining (59 minus (20 times 2)) and list B had 1 vote remaining 
(41 minus (20 times 2)). Since no list can obtain the remaining one seat 
under the original price (20 votes), the remaining seat can be obtained 
for less than 20 votes by the list with the largest number of remaining 
votes using its remaining votes. In this case, 19 votes from list A will be 
suffi cient to obtain that seat, resulting in list A sending three members to 
LegCo and list B sending two members.11 After all this, list A would have 
zero votes left, and list B would have one vote left. So the fi rst member of 
list B will rank fi rst on the precedence list after the original election.
9 Legislative Council (Amendment) Bill 2011.
10 While Annex 3 of the Consultation Paper is not about the Original Proposal, readers may fi nd 
that helpful as some of the important concepts about the Original Proposal are illustrated there.
11 Legislative Council Ordinance, s 49.
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The above illustration can also show the serious defect with the Original 
Proposal. If an elected member of list A leaves offi ce, then according to 
the proposal, a person from list B will replace him\her. This will result, 
in the scenario above, list B obtaining a majority number of seats over 
the constituency without having a majority of votes. This problem was 
widely noticed and the Original Proposal was heavily criticised.12 Faced 
with strong negative public opinion, the government, on 29 June 2011, 
replaced the Original Proposal by the following proposal (the Revised 
Proposal): instead of using the precedence list to fi ll the vacancy, the 
vacancy will be fi lled, in the fi rst instance, by members on the same list 
as the member who leaves offi ce. Only if the vacancy cannot be fi lled 
this way will the precedence list system be used to fi ll the vacancy.13 
Thinking that the revision would be suffi cient to ease public dissent, 
the government still wanted to force the legislative change without any 
formal consultation before July.14 Yet, there was widespread misgiving 
about the lack of consultation over this issue even after the government 
revised its proposal. On 1 July 2011, over 10,000 Hong Kong people 
participated in the annual demonstration against the government, and 
the dissatisfaction with the Bill and its consultation process featured as 
one of the major motivations of the demonstrators.15 In view of that, 
the government fi nally announced on 5 July 2011 that there would be a 
public consultation process for two months before resuming the second 
reading of the Bill, and a formal consultation paper was issued on 22 July 
2011. The contents of the Consultation Paper will be the subject of the 
next section.
Contents of the Consultation Paper
There are good democratic reasons for maintaining the status quo. 
By-elections refl ect, in a rather direct way, the will of the public. After 
all, Hong Kong permanent residents enjoy the constitutional right 
without unreasonable restrictions to take part in the conduct of public 
12 For example, this problem is highlighted in the statement issued by Hong Kong Bar Association 
on 25 June 2011, available at http://www.hkba.org/whatsnew/press-release/20110625.pdf 
(visited 15 Oct 2011).
13 The Constitutional and Mainland Affairs Bureau, “Replacement Mechanism”, (2011), 
 available at http://legco.gov.hk/yr10-11/english/bc/bc56/papers/bc56cb2-2226-1-e.pdf (visited 
15 Oct 2011).
14 The Constitutional and Mainland Affairs Bureau, “SJ and SCMA Speak to the Media”, (2011), 
available at http://www.cmab.gov.hk/en/press/press_2755.htm (visited 15 Oct 2011).
15 “Record Number of Demonstration Participants in Tsang’s Era”, Hong Kong Economic Times, 
2 July 2011, P01 (in Chinese).
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affairs, directly or through “freely chosen” representatives, and the rights 
to vote and to be elected at genuine elections “held by secret ballot, 
guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors”.16
The government stated in the Consultation Paper several reasons for 
changing the status quo. First, cost is involved in holding by-elections.17 
Second, LegCo will be deprived of the service of one member before 
the by-election.18 Third, the respect for the electoral process will be 
lowered if the status quo is maintained.19 Fourth, intentional triggering 
of by-elections, which is allowed by the status quo, amounts to an 
abuse of process.20 Fifth, the effect of by-elections is to introduce a 
fi rst-past-the-post element into what is otherwise a proportional 
representation system.21 Sixth, there was strong public dissatisfaction 
with the so-called de facto referendum.22 
The government suggested four options to alter the status quo. The 
fi rst option was to restrict resigning members from participating in 
any by-election in the same term. The second option was to adopt a 
replacement mechanism using the same candidate list, followed by a 
precedence list system. The third option was to use the replacement 
mechanism as stated in the second option, but adding that the replacement 
mechanism should only be triggered if the vacancy resulted from 
voluntary circumstances. The fourth option was to adopt a replacement 
mechanism using the same candidate list, followed by leaving the seat 
vacant if the list was exhausted. The second option in the Consultation 
Paper was the same as the Revised Proposal and was the option favoured 
by the government.23
The reasons put forward to support the Revised Proposal were not 
strong. Insofar as cost was a concern, one might wonder whether, in a 
society that aspires for democracy, cost should be the primary concern 
in designing an electoral system, especially in a society as well off as 
Hong Kong. That is not to say that cost, however great, is irrelevant; 
the argument is, rather, cost should not be decisive given that there is 
no suggestion that the cost involved would be astronomical. Perhaps it 
would be argued that the cost would be overwhelming if parties frequently 
trigger by-elections by voluntary resignations. However, experience 
16 Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (Cap 383), s 8, Art 21(a) & (b).
17 Consultation Paper, para 3.06.
18 Ibid., paras 1.05, 3.06.
19 Ibid., para 1.05.
20 Ibid., para 1.04.
21 Ibid., paras 1.09, 1.10, 3.06.
22 Ibid., para 1.02.
23 Ibid., paras 4.09–4.15.
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now shows that frequent (even infrequent) resignations will not be 
popular, and thus there are strong political incentives for the parties not 
to do so unless there exist strong public support or moral justifi cation.
As to the concern about deprivation of a member’s service, three 
replies could be given. First, the primary purpose of a legislature is to 
represent. As such, an electoral system should be assessed primarily 
on whether it refl ects the views of the public, a function which is not 
necessarily made better with the number of legislators in offi ce. Second, 
a proportionate response to this alleged problem only calls for an 
improvement of the effi ciency of by-elections rather than the elimination 
of them. Third, there is no evidence to suggest that the workings of the 
legislature has ever been impaired or compromised as a result of a vacancy 
(or concurrent vacancies) in the relatively short period needed to hold 
a by-election.
Regarding the concern about the loss in respect for electoral process 
it is, fi rst of all, entirely a matter of speculation that the public respect 
for the electoral system will be reduced if the status quo is maintained. 
It is not obvious that the Hong Kong public has less respect in elections 
after the de facto referendum. Moreover, the Revised Proposal, while 
better than the Original Proposal, can also lead to very undemocratic 
outcomes, as many have observed.24 Building on the example above to 
illustrate, suppose that list A only contains three members. If the Revised 
Proposal is adopted, then the vacancy would be fi lled by list B, and again, 
list B will obtain a majority of seats while being a minority party. Since 
the Revised Proposal can lead to these undemocratic outcomes while the 
status quo would not, it is arguable that adopting the Revised Proposal 
would lead to greater loss of respect for the electoral system.
As to the argument that intentional triggering of by-elections 
amounts to an abuse of process, it could be argued to the contrary, that a 
legislator resigning and triggering a by-election is advancing the highest 
ideals of democratic government. It could be argued that a legislator 
facing a highly controversial public issue might elect through resignation 
and participating in a by-election to consult the voters directly. Thus, 
rather than being an abuse of process this would be the occasion where 
a by-election is seen as serving the ideals of elected representative 
and responsible government.25 And even if we assume, for the sake of 
argument, that such intentional triggering of by-elections amounts to an 
24 Hong Kong Bar Association, “Consultation Paper on Arrangements for Filling Vacancies in the 
Legislative Council: Response of the Hong Kong Bar Association”, (2011), available at http://
www.hkba.org/whatsnew/press-release/20110831e.pdf (visited 24 Oct 2011), paras 20–21.
25 We thank Michael Davis for this idea.
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abuse of process, we might wonder whether the adoption of the Revised 
Proposal, which may lead to undemocratic outcomes, is a proportionate 
response, especially given that, as we have argued above, there are already 
political incentives for parties not to trigger by-elections too frequently.
The objection that the effect of by-elections is to introduce a 
fi rst-past-the-post element into what is otherwise a proportional 
representation system can be illustrated as follows. Imagine after the 
original election, a party B representative leaves his/her offi ce. In such 
a case, under the status quo, party A would probably take the seat as it 
would probably win the by-election. One may think it is unfair to party B, 
and thus the status quo is unsatisfactory. To this objection two replies can 
be given. First, we might wonder whether proportional representation 
is really a good expression of the democratic ideal. Second, the Revised 
Proposal may not be a solution at all to the problem of ensuring proportional 
representation. Imagine the following situation in the original election: 
list A obtained 60 votes, list B obtained 39 votes, list C obtained 1 vote, 
so three candidates on list A and two candidates on list B were elected. 
However, suppose that list A only has three candidates and list B only 
has two candidates and one elected candidate has to resign. In this case, 
the seat will go to list C instead of list B or list A. It is unclear that this 
outcome coheres with the ideal of proportional representation, especially 
in the case where the resigned candidate is from party A.
Is the government right in saying that the public opinion is in favour 
of adopting the Revised Proposal? The government cited the low turnout 
rate in the by-election in 2010 and the fact that a large number of people 
were against the so-called referendum in 2010 as indirect evidence.26 In 
reply, it is true that the turnout rate of the by-election in 2010 was low 
and that the so-called referendum in 2010 was not very popular. But that 
does not per se show that people dislike by-elections in general,27 and even 
if that is true, that would not per se show that they take by-elections to be 
a worse evil than the Revised Proposal. The government, furthermore, 
said recently that some polls supported its claim that the public is in 
favour of a change.28 But insofar as polls are concerned, there are actually 
some polls showing contrary results.29 
26 Consultation Paper, para 1.01.
27 It must not be forgotten that the turn-out rates in the 2000 and 2007 by-elections were quite 
high. We thank Johannes Chan for this point.
28 “Stephen Lam Stated that Poll Results Support Plunging the By-election Loophole”, 
Hong Kong Daily News, 27 August 2011, A04 (in Chinese).
29 Some of the poll results are surveyed in “The Battle over Poll Results between the Pro-Democratic 
Camp and its Opponent”, Sing Tao Daily, 23 July 2011, A04 (in Chinese).
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Moreover, a study done by the Hong Kong Deliberative Polling 
 Project (a joint project between the Radio Television Hong Kong and 
the Public Opinion Programme of the University of Hong Kong) may 
be relevant here.30 The study included a deliberative session on the 
Revised Proposal, and asked the participants to indicate their preference 
concerning whether the status quo should be maintained before and 
after the session. It was found that after the session, the proportion of 
participants in support of maintaining the status quo increased from 48 
per cent to 55 per cent. The sample size in this study was small, so the 
result should be taken with a grain of salt.31 Yet, if what we are looking 
for is reasoned public opinion, we might wonder whether the poll results 
adduced by the government should be taken at their face value.
Concluding Thoughts
As mentioned above, the reaction to the Revised Proposal was mixed 
insofar as the public opinion polls were concerned. Many academics 
and legal practitioners were, however, against the proposal. The Bar 
 Association and the Law Society submitted responses to the Consultation 
Paper, stating that the government had not demonstrated a strong case 
for change.32 Over 100 academics in Hong Kong signed a petition stating 
that the status quo should be maintained.33 Even persons usually regarded 
as being more pro-government stated that the four options suggested 
by the government were not ideal.34 Whether the government will 
ultimately accommodate these views is unclear. 
With the new Secretary for Constitutional and Mainland Affairs, 
Raymond Tam, previously Director of the Chief Executive’s Offi ce, it 
is interesting to wonder what will happen next. At the time of writing, 
more than a month has passed since the end date of the consultation 
period. More likely than not, the Administration was intent to keep the 
issue under wraps until after the region-wide District Council elections 
30 The details of the study are available at http://hkupop.hku.hk/chinese/features/rthkdf2011sep/
index.html (visited 15 Oct 2011).
31 85 people participated in the study.
32 The responses of the two professional associations are available at http://www.hkba.org/
whatsnew/press-release/20110831e.pdf (visited 15 Oct 2011) and http://www.hklawsoc.org.hk/
pub_e/news/submissions/20110921.pdf (visited 15 Oct 2011).
33 The petition is available at https://www.mindvan.com/ourdb/fi les/ourdb@ourtv.hk/110922_
joint_dec.pdf (visited 15 Oct 2011) (in Chinese).
34 “The Basic Law Institute Suggested a Fifth Option”, Ming Pao Daily, 15 September 2011, A16 
(in Chinese).
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to be held on 6 November 2011, so as not to have any unnecessary 
anti-government sentiments affect the election results.
It is not inconceivable that the consultation results show no 
consensus with any particular proposal, in which case the government 
could not legitimately proceed to reform without further engagement 
with the community. In this situation it would be highly unlikely if 
anything further would be done in the remaining months of the Donald 
Tsang Administration. Even the new 2012 Administration may drop 
the matter altogether, or at least until there are signs of further “abuse” 
of by-elections. The situation would not be comparable to the ongoing 
problem of legislating national security legislation because there is 
certainly no constitutional duty to abolish by-elections. 
If the consultation results showed a consensus in favour of maintaining 
the status quo (which is consistent with having no consensus in public 
opinion polls), then acting honestly and consistent with past practices 
the Administration would need to drop the matter. This would be 
consistent with its approach to the question of reforming the restrictions 
on prisoner’s rights to vote. The results of that public consultation had 
shown that the public largely supported the removal of all restrictions on 
prisoner voting and the government gave effect to that desire.35
On refl ection the entire episode has served to remind us once again 
that the views of Hong Kong people cannot be taken for granted when it 
comes to law reform that impinges on fundamental rights and freedoms.
35 See The Constitutional and Mainland Affairs Bureau, “Report on Public Consultation 
on Prisoners’ Voting Right”, (2009), para. 4.03, accessible at www.cmab.gov.hk/doc/
ConsultationReport_e_fi nal.pdf (visited 15 October 2011).
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